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Abstract—A robot operating in isolation needs to reason
over the uncertainty in its model of the world and adapt its
own actions to account for this uncertainty. Similarly, a robot
interacting with people needs to reason over its uncertainty
over the human internal state, as well as over how this
state may change, as humans adapt to the robot. This paper
summarizes our own work in this area, which depicts the
different ways that probabilistic planning and game-theoretic
algorithms can enable such reasoning in robotic systems that
collaborate with people. We start with a general formulation
of the problem as a two-player game with incomplete infor-
mation. We then articulate the different assumptions within
this general formulation, and we explain how these lead to
exciting and diverse robot behaviors in real-time interactions
with actual human subjects, in a variety of manufacturing,
personal robotics and assistive care settings.
I. INTRODUCTION
In human collaboration, the success of the team often
depends on the ability of team members to coordinate
their actions, by reasoning over the beliefs and actions of
their teammates. We want to enable robot teammates with
this very capability in human-robot teams, e.g., service
robots interacting with users at home, manufacturing
robots sharing the same physical scape with human me-
chanics and autonomous cars interacting with drivers and
pedestrians.
When it comes to robots operating in isolation, there
has been tremendous progress in enabling them to act
autonomously by reasoning over the physical state of the
world. A manipulator picking up a glass needs to know
the position and orientation of the glass on the table,
the location of other objects that it should avoid, and the
way these objects will move if pushed to the side. More
importantly, it needs to reason over the uncertainty in its
model of the world and adapt its own actions to account
for this uncertainty, for instance by looking at the table
with its camera, or by moving slowly until it senses the
glass in its gripper.
However, humans are not just obstacles that the robot
should avoid. They are intelligent agents with their own
This is a summary of work done in collaboration with Keren Gu,
Anton Kuznetsov, Minae Kwon, Premyszlaw Lasota, Swaprava Nath, Ariel
Procaccia, Ramya Ramakrishnan, Yu Xiang Zhu.
Fig. 1: The robot maximizes the performance of the
human-robot team by executing the optimal policy piR
∗
.
The robot takes information-seeking actions that allow es-
timation of the human policy piH, but also communicative
actions that guide piH towards better ways of doing the
task. These actions emerge out of optimizing for piR
∗
.
internal state, i.e., their own goals and expectations about
the world and the robot. Their state can change, as they
adapt themselves to the robot and its actions. Much like
in manipulation, a robot interacting with people needs
to use this information when choosing its own actions
(Fig. 1). This requires not only an understanding of human
behavior when interacting with robotic systems, but also
of the computational challenges and opportunities that
arise by enabling this reasoning into deployed systems in
the real world.
To address these challenges, we have used insights from
behavioral economics to propose scalable models of hu-
man behavior and machine learning algorithms to auto-
matically learn these models from data. Integrating these
models into probabilistic planning and game-theoretic
algorithms has allowed generation of robot actions in a
computationally tractable manner.
This paper is a summary of our work in this area,
which has been inspired by recent technical advances in
human-robot interaction [1], and to a large extent it has
been made possible by breakthroughs in computational
representations of uncertainty [2], and in algorithms that
have leveraged these representations [3]. It has also been
inspired by the remarkable results of game-theoretic algo-
rithms in deployed applications [4].
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Fig. 2: We have applied our research to human-robot collaboration across different robot morphologies and settings:
in manufacturing, assistive care, social navigation and at home.
We start by formulating our overarching goal of com-
puting the robot actions that maximize team performance
as an optimization problem in a two-player game with
incomplete information (Sec. II). In hindsight, our ap-
proaches in the last years reflect the different assumptions
and approximations that we made within the scope of this
general formulation.
We start by assuming a leader-assistant teamwork
model 1, where the goal of the robot is to follow the
human preference (Sec. III). We show that this model is
an instance of our general framework by representing the
human preference as a reward function, shared by both
agents and unknown to the robot. We show that cross-
training [5], [6], an algorithm emulating effective human
team training practices, as well as clustering users into
types from joint-action demonstrations [7] significantly
improves robot adaptation to the human.
We then examine the case when the robot can indirectly
affect human actions as an equal partner, by treating
the interaction as an underactuated dynamical system
(Sec. IV). We present a bounded-memory model [8]–[10]
and a best-response model of human behavior [11], and
show that this results in human-adaptation to the robot.
Finally, closing the loop between the two results in mu-
tual adaptation (Sec. IV): The robot builds online a model
of the human adaptation by taking information seeking
actions, and adapts its own actions in return [8]–[10].
Table I organizes the works presented in this paper, with
respect to the different aspects of the general formulation
that each one addresses.
Each section articulates the different assumptions
and explains how these lead to the robot behaviors
that we observed in real-time interactions with actual
human subjects, in a variety of manufacturing, home
environments and assistive care settings (Fig. 2).
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Human-robot collaboration can be formulated as a two
player game with partial information. We let xt be the
world state that captures the information that human and
robot use at time t to take actions aRt , a
H
t in a collaborative
1We refer the reader to [14] for the definitions of leader-assistant and
equal partners teamwork models.
task. Over the course of a task of total time duration T ,
robot and human receive an accumulated reward:
T∑
t=1
RR(xt ,a
R
t ,a
H
t )
for the robot and
T∑
t=1
RH(xt ,a
R
t ,a
H
t )
for the human.
We assume a robot policy piR, which maps world states
to actions. The human chooses their own actions based
on a human policy piH. If the robot could control both its
own and the human actions, it would simply compute the
policies that maximize its own reward.
However, the human is not another actuator that the
robot can control. Instead, the robot can only estimate
the human decision making process from observation and
make predictions about future human behavior, which in
turn will affect the reward that the robot will receive.
Therefore, the optimal policy for the robot is computed
by taking the expectation over human policies piH.
piR
∗ ∈ argmax
piR
E
[
T∑
t=1
RR(xt ,a
R
t ,a
H
t )|piR,piH
]
(1)
Solving this optimization is challenging: First, the hu-
man reward RH may be unknown to the robot in advance.
Second, even if the robot knows RH, it may be unable to
predict accurately the human actions, since human be-
havior is characterized by bounded rationality [12]. Third,
even if the human acts always rationally, exhaustively
searching for the equilibria is computationally intractable
in most cases [13]. Finally, even if RH ≡ RR, most real-
world problems have multiple equilibria, and in the ab-
sence of a signaling mechanism, it is impossible to know
which ones the agents will choose.
III. ROBOT ADAPTATION.
In several manufacturing applications, such as assembly
tasks, although important concepts such as tolerances and
completion times are well-defined, many of the details
are largely left up to the individualized preference of the
mechanics. A robotic assistant interacting with a new
human worker should be able to learn the preferences of
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Fig. 3: Cross-training in a virtual environment leads to fluent human-robot teaming.
its human partner in order to be an effective teammate.
We assume a leader-assistant teamwork model, where
the human leader’s preference is captured by the human
reward function RH and the human policy piH. In this
model, the goal of the robot is to execute actions aligned
with the human preference. Therefore, in Eq. 1, we have:
RR ≡RH
Learning of a Human Model. Learning jointly piH and RH
can be challenging in settings where human and robot
take actions simultaneously, and do not have identical ac-
tion sets. To enable a robot to learn the human preference
in collaborative settings, we looked at how humans com-
municate effectively their preferences in human teams.
In previous work [14], insights from human teamwork
have informed the design of a robot plan execution
system which improved human-robot team performance.
We focused on a team training technique known as cross-
training, where human team-members switch roles to
develop shared expectations on the task. This, in turn
allows them to anticipate one another’s needs and coor-
dinate effectively. Using this insight, we proposed human-
robot cross-training [5], [6], [15], a framework where the
robot learns a model of its human counter-part through
two phases: a forward-phase, where human and robot
follow their pre-defined roles, and a rotation phase, where
the roles of human and robot are switched. The forward
phase enables the robot to observe the human actions
and estimate the human policy piH. The rotation phase
allows the robot to observe the human inputs on the
robot actions and infer the human preference RH from
human demonstrations [16]. After each training round,
which occurs in a virtual environment, the robot uses the
new estimates to compute the optimal policy from Eq. 1.
Our studies showed that cross-training provides significant
improvements in quantitative metrics of team fluency, as
well as in the perceived robot performance and trust in
the robot (Fig. 3). These results provide the first indication
that effective and fluent human-robot teaming may be
best achieved by modeling effective training practices for
human teamwork.
Inference of a Human Type. Cross-training works by
learning an individualized model for each human team-
mate. For more complex tasks, this results in a large
number of training rounds, which can be tedious from
a human-robot interaction perspective. However, our pi-
lot studies showed that even when there was a very
large number of feasible action sequences towards task
completion, people followed a limited number of “domi-
nant” strategies. Using this insight, we used unsupervised
learning techniques to identify distinct human types from
joint-action demonstrations (Fig. 4) [7]. For each type
y ∈ Y , we used supervised learning techniques to learn
the human reward RH(xt ,aRt ,a
H
t ; y), as well as the human
Cross
Training
[5], [6], [15]
Human
Type Inference
[7]
Bounded
Memory
[8], [10]
Best
Response
[11]
Mutual
Adaptation
[8]–[10]
HUMAN MODEL
Known 3 3
Unknown 3 3 3
INTERACTION MODEL
Independent 3 3
Underactuated 3 3 3
TEAMWORK MODEL
Leader-Assistant 3 3
Equal Partners 3 3 3
TABLE I: Each work makes different assumptions on the human, interaction and teamwork models.
Fig. 4: We clustered participants into types, based on how
their preference of executing a hand-finishing task with
the robot.
policy piH(xt ; y), This simplified the problem of learning
RH,piH of a new human worker, to simply inferring their
type y . We enabled this inference by denoting the human
type as a latent variable in a partially observable stochastic
process (POMDP). This allowed the robot to take informa-
tion seeking actions in order to infer online the type a new
user, and execute actions aligned with the preference of
that type. This draws upon insights from previous work
on cooperative games [17] and vehicle navigation [18],
where the human intent was modeled as a latent variable
in a POMDP, albeit with prespecified models of human
types. In a human subject experiment, participants found
that the robot executing the computed policy anticipated
their actions, and in complex robot configurations they
completed the task faster than manually annotating robot
actions.
IV. HUMAN ADAPTATION.
As robotics systems become more advanced, they have
access to information that the human may not have; this
suggests that rather than always following the human,
they could use this information as equal partners to guide
their human teammates towards better ways of doing
the task. In that case, it is no longer optimal for the
robot to optimize the human reward function; instead, the
robot should maximize its own reward function, which is
different than the human’s:
RR 6=RH
An improvement upon the leader-assistant setting is to
recognize that the human policy can change based on the
robot actions. We let a history of world states and robot
actions ht :
ht = (x0,aR0 , ...,xt ,aRt )
Given this history, the human policy piH(xt ,ht ; y) is
a function not only of the current world state xt and
human type yt , but also of the history ht . Modeling the
human policy as a function of the robot actions and
solving the optimization of Eq. 1 makes the interaction an
α 1− α
RH aH
aR
RR aH
aR
Fig. 5: The human state changes, as the human plays with
probability α the best response to the robot action aR
(middle row) with respect to the robot reward function
RR, instead of playing the best-response with respect to
their own reward function RH.
underactuated dynamical system, where the robot reasons
over how its own actions affect future human actions, and
takes that into account into its own decision making.
A Bounded-Memory Model. This history ht can grow
arbitrarily large, making optimizing for the robot actions
computationally intractable. In practice, however, people
do not have perfect recall. Using insights from work on
bounded-rationality in behavioral economics, we simplify
the optimization, using a Bounded-memory human Adap-
tation Model (BAM) [8], [10]. The human observes a recent
history of interactions hk :
hk = (xt−k ,aRt−k , ...,xt ,aRt )
and infers a probability distribution over joint global plans
that the robot is executing. They may then switch from
the plan they currently follow, to a new plan demonstrated
by the robot with some probability associated with their
type y – their willingness to adapt to the robot.
A Best-Response Model. A particular instance of treating
interaction as an underactuated system is modeling peo-
ple as computing a best-response to the last robot action
using their reward function RH:
piH(xt ,a
R
t ; y) ∈ argmax
aH
RH(xt ,a
R
t ,a
H
t ; y)
In [11], we additionally broke the assumption that
RH is static; instead, as the human observes the robot’s
actions and the outcomes, they may change their reward
function RH to match those of the robot’s. We captured
this change by assuming that the reward parameters y are
not static but change stochastically based on the robot
actions, according to a transition function: P (yt+1|yt ,aRt ).
For instance, the human may learn the true best response
to a robot action with some probability (Fig. 5). Including
this model in the optimization of Eq. 1 allows the robot
to take informative actions to teach the human, even by
failing in purpose [11].
Fig. 6: Two different users control an assistive arm through joystick inputs. The plot indicates the robot belief (y-axis)
on user’s adaptability (x-axis). The robot starts by moving straight towards both bottles, in order to infer the user
adaptability. Top, left to right: A non-adaptable user insists on moving the joystick to the left and the robot adapts to
the user to retain their trust. Bottom, left to right: The user changes their inputs to align them with the robot actions.
The robot infers that the user is adaptable and guides them towards the optimal goal (right bottle).
The cardinality of Y can grow exponential to the num-
ber of robot actions, which makes the problem compu-
tationally hard. Using our intuition that early exploration
should be encouraged, in [11] we simplified the compu-
tation via a linear-time optimal algorithm for solving the
maximization of Eq. 1, and showed that our model can
capture accurately the evolution of human behavior in a
table-clearing setting.
V. MUTUAL ADAPTATION.
In our models of human adaptation, we have assumed
that the robot knows the type y of the human, which
parameterizes the human policy piH and the human
reward function RH. However, our studies have shown
that there is a large variability among different types
y . Additionally, the type y of a new human worker is
typically unknown in advance to the robot and it cannot
be fully observed. In [8]–[10] we relax the assumption
of a known y for the human. Instead, we treat y as a
latent variable in a partially observable stochastic pro-
cess, in particularly a mixed-observability Markov decision
process, which has been shown to achieve significant
computational efficiency [2]. This allows the robot to take
information seeking actions to infer online the parameter
y , which specifies how the human policy piH is affected
by the robot’s own actions. As a result, human and robot
mutually adapt to each other; the robot builds online a
model of how the human adapts to the robot by inferring
their type y , and adapts its own actions in return.
We instantiated the mutual adaptation formalism using
as human type y the human adaptability, that is their
willingness to adapt to new strategy demonstrated the
robot. Fig. 6 shows an instance of the mutual adaptation
formalism in a shared autonomy setting. In this setting,
User 1 User 2 User 3
Fig. 7: Different paths on MOMDP policy tree for a
human-robot (white/black dot) table-carrying task. The
circle color represents the belief on the human adaptabil-
ity, with darker shades indicating higher probability for
smaller values (less adaptability). The white circles denote
a uniform distribution over human adaptability. The table
color indicates disagreement (red) or agreement (green)
between human and robot actions. User 1 is inferred as
non-adaptable, whereas Users 2 and 3 are adaptable.
the robot infers a distribution over goals based on the
user input, and assists the user for that distribution [19].
Mutual adaptation additionally allows the robot to reason
over how the user goal may change, as the user adapts
themselves to the robot. In our example, the starting
user preference is for the robot to go towards the left
bottle, while the robot considers the right bottle as a
better goal, for instance because it is heavier and it should
be placed in the green bin first. The robot starts by
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Fig. 8: Results for the three conditions in our human
subjects experiment [9]. Robot-adaptation only: the robot
assisted the user on their preference. Mutual-adaptation:
The proposed formalism of Sec. V. No adaptation: The
robot goes to the optimal goal always ignoring the user.
Mutual-adaptation performs better than robot adaptation
only, since a large number of users adapted to the robot,
while achieving comparable trust-ratings. No adaptation
achieves the maximum performance by definition, but to
the detriment of reported user trust in the robot.
moving straight (information-seeking action), observing
whether the human changes their inputs to follow the
robot (adaptable user), or insists on pushing the joystick
to the left (non-adaptable). If the human is adaptable
(bottom-row), the robot will guide them towards a better
way of doing the task. If the human is non-adaptable
(top-row), the robot follows the human preference towards
the left-bottle, in order to retain their trust. Similarly,
Fig. 7 shows the MOMDP policy tree for a table-carrying
task. The robot infers the user adaptability, and chooses
whether to move the table following the user’s initial
preference, or to guide the user towards moving the table
in the opposite direction. Our experiments in collaborative
manipulation [8], social navigation [10] and shared au-
tonomy [9] settings showed that, when compared to one-
way robot adaptation to the human, mutual adaptation
significantly improved human-robot team performance,
while achieving comparable trust ratings (Fig. 8).
VI. DISCUSSION
We presented a summary of our work in human-
robot collaboration. We formulated the general problem
as a two-player game with incomplete information, where
human and robot know each other’s goals. We then made
a set of different assumptions and approximations within
the scope of this general formulation. Each assumption
resulted in diverse and exciting team coordination behav-
iors, which had a strong effect on team performance.
We have shown that representing the human preference
as a human reward function unknown to the robot and
computing the robot policy that maximizes this function
results in robot adaptation to the human. Assuming the
human reward function to be known and treating the
interaction as an underactuated dynamical system results
in human adaptation to the robot. Closing the loop
between the two results in mutual adaptation, where the
robot builds online a model of human adaptation, and
adapts its own actions in return.
We have applied the mutual adaptation formalism in
collaborative manipulation, social navigation and shared
autonomy settings. We have also been using the same
formalism to incorporate verbal communication between
the robot and the human [20]. We are excited about
generalizing our work in a variety of domains, robot
morphologies and interaction modalities, where an au-
tonomous system plans its actions by incorporating the
human internal state. The number of applications is vast:
an autonomous car can infer the aggressiveness of a
nearby driver and choose to wait or proceed; a GPS system
may infer whether a user is willing to follow its prompts;
a personal robot at home can “nudge” a user about taking
breaks and sleeping more.
As these applications become more complex, our work
has a number of limitations. The models of human in-
ternal state that robots can build reliably are restricted
and achieving optimal behavior in large, high-dimensional
spaces faces computational intractability. To this end,
flexible, compact representations of the human internal
state and new algorithms for reasoning about these rep-
resentations give much promise.
Overall, we believe that we have brought about a
better understanding of different ways that probabilis-
tic planning and game-theoretic algorithms can support
principled reasoning in robotic systems that collaborate
with people. We look forward to continue addressing the
exciting scientific challenges in this area.
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